



THE SCIENCE OF ABROGATION (ABROGATION): MODERN CRITIQUE

SAINS TENTANG NASIKH-MANSUKH (ABROGASI): KRITIK MODERN

Dheen Muhammedh Subaideen

Hamad Bin Khalifa University College of Islamic Studies, Email : dheenllb.hk@gmail.com

*email koresponden: dheenllb.hk@gmail.com

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Abstract

Abrogation (abrogation) holds a central, vexed position in Islamic legal-theological hermeneutics. Classical uṣūl al-fiqh elaborated a technical theory of abrogation that attempted to mediate the diachronic process of revelation and the demands of fixity of legal judgment (ḥukm). Tradition receipts that later scripture abrogates earlier scripture wherever actual, unavoidable contradiction is found, classically expressed as "al-nāsikh wa-l-mansūkh". Pre-modern thinkers classified modes and cases of abrogation, inferred them from revelational phases, and counted suspected cases throughout the Qur'an and Sunna. Modern scholarship avoids both epistemic pretensions and hyperbolic earlier assertions of abrogation. The article tracks early meanings, introduces intratraditional caution that moderated abrogation, and evaluates recent re-analyses based on coherence theory, maqāṣid (purposes), historicization in context, and ethics. It argues that abrogation was included in pre-modern dogmatics as a component of a package of other hermeneutical strategies (specification, restriction, prioritization, suspension) and that available resources allow for a less ambitious, economy-of-means approach. A renovated dogma leaner, evidence-based, and syncretized with maqāṣid and semantics can ensure the normativity of revelation and make the law more attentive to modern moral concerns, such as gender justice, religious pluralism, and violence. The paper reaches its climax with the proposal of a "manifest conflict resolution" regime. where abrogation is held in reserve as a last resort and not the initial starting point and has ramification for legal rulings (fatwā), legal codification and education more widely. (Hallaq 1993; Kamali 2003; Auda 2008; Rahman 1982; Abu Zayd 2006).

Keywords : Abrogation, Qur'anic Hermeneutics, Uṣūl Al-Fiqh, Maqāṣid Al-Sharī'a, Coherence Theory, Ethics, Historicism, Usul, Exegesis.

Abstrak

Konsep naskh (abrogasi atau penghapusan hukum) menempati posisi sentral sekaligus problematis dalam hermeneutika hukum-teologis Islam. Disiplin uṣūl al-fiqh klasik merumuskan teori teknis



mengenai abrogasi yang berupaya menjembatani proses pewahyuan yang bersifat diakronis dengan tuntutan kepastian hukum (hukm). Tradisi menerima prinsip bahwa teks wahyu yang datang kemudian dapat menghapus (nāsikh) teks wahyu sebelumnya (mansūkh) apabila ditemukan pertentangan nyata yang tak terelakkan sebuah konsep yang secara klasik dikenal sebagai al-nāsikh wa-l-mansūkh. Para pemikir pra-modern mengklasifikasikan berbagai bentuk dan kasus abrogasi, menyimpulkannya berdasarkan tahapan pewahyuan, serta mendata kasus-kasus yang dianggap termasuk dalam kategori ini di seluruh Al-Qur'an dan Sunnah. Kajian modern cenderung menghindari klaim epistemik yang berlebihan maupun pernyataan-pernyataan hiperbolis mengenai abrogasi yang muncul pada masa sebelumnya. Artikel ini menelusuri makna-makna awal konsep tersebut, memperkenalkan sikap kehati-hatian internal tradisi yang membatasi penerapan abrogasi, serta mengevaluasi analisis-analisis terkini yang didasarkan pada teori koherensi, maqāṣid (tujuan hukum), historisasi kontekstual, dan etika. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa abrogasi dimasukkan ke dalam doktrin pra-modern sebagai bagian dari rangkaian strategi hermeneutis lainnya (seperti spesifikasi, pembatasan, penentuan prioritas, dan penangguhan hukum), dan bahwa sumber-sumber yang tersedia memungkinkan pendekatan yang lebih bersahaja serta efisien. Doktrin yang diperbarui yang lebih ringkas, berbasis bukti, serta memadukan prinsip maqāṣid dan semantik dapat menjamin sifat normatif wahyu sekaligus menjadikan hukum lebih responsif terhadap isu-isu moral modern, seperti keadilan gender, pluralisme agama, dan kekerasan. Tulisan ini memuncak pada usulan mengenai rezim "penyelesaian konflik yang nyata" (manifest conflict resolution), di mana abrogasi ditempatkan sebagai langkah terakhir (bukan titik awal) dan memiliki implikasi luas terhadap penetapan hukum (fatwa), kodifikasi hukum, serta pendidikan hukum. (Hallaq 1993; Kamali 2003; Auda 2008; Rahman 1982; Abu Zayd 2006).

Kata Kunci : Nasakh, Hermeneutika Al-Qur'an, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, Maqāṣid al-Sharī'a, Teori Koherensi, Etika, Historisisme, Uṣūl, Eksegesis.

1. INTRODUCTION

Abrogation or abrogation is the distinctive but contrary stance of Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and Qur'anic exegesis. It was previously an exercise in verticality in which the later revelation nullified or modified an earlier one when two authorities are available with an absolute contradiction. Premodern jurists, having two and a quarter millennium of diachronic data available and being under a deontic constraint to provide pragmatically effective results in law for early societies, guided the doctrine in its effort to synthesize scriptural evidence, provide standardization in law, and put an end to agonistic hermeneutics (al-Juwaynī 1950; al-Āmidī 1985; Kamali 2003). Historically responsible in its utilitarian role, the doctrine has at times been a victim of inflation. This is occasioned from time to time in history, for collections of exegetical typologies demanded dozens if not scores of presumed abrogation's, as structural pressure or polemic too often preferred cancellation to the rule where reconciliation or stipulation would have sufficed (Ibn al-Jawzī 1987; al-Suyūṭī 2008; Hallaq 1993). The result has been tension on the community: abrogation is legally determined but counter to scriptural continuity and moral consistency if loosely interpreted. The epistemological assumptions and limits of the doctrine have more recently been reopened in good faith. Philology, discourse theory, and contextuality studies have discovered that the vast majority of alleged contradictions are variant speech-acts, addressees, or fields of application and not disagreement on normativity (Rahman 1982; Abu Zayd 2006; Saeed 2006).

Readings for coherence (naẓm) and semantic analysis scatter cancellation illusion on thematic bases, ring structure, and intra-textual cohesion. Maqāṣid al-sharī'a tradition, on the other hand, translates legal knowledge into higher ends such as justice, felicity, honor, and protection of life, intellect, lineage, and property; preemption test over earlier advice, in this paradigm, is higher than convenience or precedence of explication (Shāṭibī 1997; Auda 2008). Contemporary jurists are therefore doubly bound: to stay within the sources and to offer hermeneutic explication for ethical and socio-historical profundity.



The treatise develops minimalist, ascetic theory of abrogation and preserves abrogation as a last-resort resort-of-last-resort backstop to general normative architecture of conflict resolution. The thesis incorporates historical assurances reinterpreted in the form of chronological demonstrability and presumption of reconciliation into new hermeneutic methodology and maqāṣid-inspired ethics. Through paradigmatic examples (intoxicants, qibla, bequest/inheritance, so-called "sword verses," gender-related verses), it demonstrates that most of the traditional case can be reformulated without abrogation and semantic integrity and moral continuity maintained thus.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Classical Theory Of Abrogation

Islamic legal theory and Qur'anic exegesis are defined by their theory of abrogation, i.e., abrogation or supersession through a later revelation of an earlier divine law for which reconciliation is impossible. The exegetes and jurists tried from the earliest decades of Islam to eliminate contradictions emerging out of successive revelation and by change in the socio-legal context of the early Muslim society. Al-Ṭabarī (2000) illustrates how the companions of the Prophet struggled to remove contradictions between war, wine, and prayer surahs and insisted on systematic accounts of God's pedagogy unfolding over centuries. To Muslims at the time, abrogation became an introspective bridge that preserved the unity of the Quran but temporarily explained the dynamic unrolling of guidance.

Significant effort in the classical period was spent explaining the epistemological basis and boundaries of abrogation. (Al-Juwaynī 1950) and (al-Āmidī 1985) were two of those who set down conditions under which abrogation could legitimately take place. Al-Āmidī, in *Al-Iḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām*, recommends abrogation to occur only if two equally authoritative sources result in a contradiction irreconcilable, that the abrogator is thus temporally, and that all hermeneutical tools of reconciliation or specification have been tried. His definition of the doctrine was maintaining the holiness of revelation by checking human arbitrariness in eliminating a verse.

Imam al-Shāfi'ī's (1892/1980) *Al-Risāla* is the second pillar. Despite the theoretical appeal of abrogation, al-Shāfi'ī resists hermeneutic freedom and opts for harmonization where it is possible. Al-Shāfi'ī deemed the majority of so-called abrogation's to be a matter of qualification or contextual specification rather than absolute abrogation. With his distinction between general and particular texts ('āmm and khaṣṣ), and unconditional and conditional verdicts, al-Shāfi'ī endeavored to limit access to abrogation while safeguarding the absoluteness of divine speech.

Later interpreters and jurists elaborated or legalized his findings further. Ibn al-Jawzī's *Nawawī al-Quran* enumerated and categorized verses reputed to be abrogated, as there was increasing demand for specific numerals (Ibn al-Jawzī 1987). Al-Suyūṭī (2008) in *Al-Itqān fī 'Ulūm al-Quran* enumerated inclusive numbers usually more than two hundred occurrences demonstrating scholar's zeal along with inflationist drift. These writings account for how the doctrine grew from a restrictive rule of interpretation to an encyclopedia, with abrogation claims heaping humble limits of past intellectuals.

There were complaints in the meantime. Different scholars dealt with just a few examples in life usually not more than five when arriving at the conclusion that God's appearance can be noncontradictory except for lagged kinds of legislation such as intoxicants, war, or inheritance (Powers 1988; Burton 1990). Some such as Zahiri jurist Ibn Hazm opined that abrogation had to involve categorical evidence from the text and could not be done by inference. The subsequent pluralism has the effect that even in the ancient system abrogation was not one. (Kamālī 2003) discovers that most jurists imposed internal checks, such as the one that abrogation can't be on account of single report of ḥadīth (khabar āḥād) alone and abrogation can never be imposed as regards theological essentials or moral universals.

Despite such frailties, application of the doctrine grew gargantuan in its phenomenality at times to be used for systematization or polemical purposes to the loss of exegetical imperatives. Abrogation also became an easy instrument to justify theological inconsistency or excuse juristic biases. This resulted in what subsequent reformers described as "abrogation inflation" eventually and eroded the



Quran's moral authority. Those lists were never vacant is proof that while the earlier philosophers have developed methodological restraint, the following generations were always susceptible to interpretive excesses (Kamālī 2003; Rahman 1982).

Modern Critiques: Philology, Hermeneutics And Coherence

The modern era witnessed an implicit redefinition of abrogation based on the grounds of philological, hermeneutic, and ethical coherences. The pioneer of such a rethinking is Fazlur Rahman (1982). The previous jurists, according to his opinion, have been mistaken in viewing the pedagogic and ethical maturation of revelation as abrogation. The apparent contradictions of the Quran hide an expanding pedagogy for moral maturation rather than legal cancellation for Rahman. Most of what was in the past called abrogation, i.e., gradual prohibition of alcohol, are stages of moral instruction evolution for him. The approach of Rahman downgrades abrogation from a legal concept to an process moral-historical and therefore uses context of history in Qur'anic interpretation.

(Nasr Hāmid Abū Zayd 2006) took criticism further by locating the Quran within a model linguistic and discourse analytic. He argues that revelation must be conceived as coherent text with internal semantic and rhetorical coherence, not incoherent law code. Maqāma al-khitāb (context of address) and maḥmūd al-Nass (meaning expressed) are the center of his discursive theory of the Quran. Abū Zayd argues that conventional jurists had repudiated what was regarded as contradiction with contempt when it was the result of insensitivity toward change of addressee or rhetorical function. Therefore, the majority of instances of abrogation are minimized to thematic elaboration or contextual demarcation but not literal abrogation. His book reflects the change in hermeneutics from positivist to contextual reading for concordance with the new linguistics philosophy and semiotics. (Abdullah Saeed 2006) is another "contextualist" hermeneutic. He believes that the Quran's ethical universals and linguistic variations must be used for interpretation rather than juristic categories of medieval provenance. Here abrogation is reserved, being employed only when coherence, language, and morality leave no space for anything else. Saeed's approach is the one followed by moral logic and by a sense of historical distance between Qur'anic and modern society. In reconstructing the context of interpretation, he is better than literalist interpretations using medieval abrogation's dogmatically to apply modern issues.

In the meantime, other scholars such as (Jasser Auda 2008) and (Jamal al-Banna 2009) repeated maqāṣid al-sharia (Islamic law's higher values) as a call to repair. According to them, abrogation can never be employed so that justice, benevolence, or public good the law's very goals are ignored. Auda's systems theory model perceives sharia as a dynamic, open system whose disconnected rulings converge to achieve beyond-time goals. All such abrogation appeals that result in immorality or injustice lack maqāṣid. Al-Banna takes the argument a step ahead so much so that abrogation yields to public good and moral consistency if obstinate literalism is opposed by reason and justice.

Together, these reformist scholars arrive at some conclusions: (1) most abrogation's in classical sources are specification or contextualization; (2) the timing of revelation is typically indeterminate, which undermines "later vs. earlier" arguments; and (3) applying medieval abrogation models to modern contexts allows for ethical discontinuity. They adopt what may be characterized as a "minimalist" approach to abrogation understanding the principle in generality but limiting its application to plain instances in which accommodation is impossible. This restores internal consistency to the Quran and preserves its moral course (Brown 1999; Auda 2008).

There is also criticism from modern philology. Scholars like (Neuwirth 2010) and (Zebiri 1993) identify that most of the abrogation-based arguments of the early period rely on post-Prophetic chronologies that have no firm textual basis. Since the Quran was not sent down with dates, determining a chronology for "abrogating" verses would have needed to be hypothetical. Modern textual criticism thus dissolves the empirical basis of abrogation while further strengthening the argument of restraint of interpretation. (Rippin 2001) additionally adds that abrogation was once a juristic tool in the attempt to achieve doctrinal balance in the era of exegetical diversity but is not a requirement within contemporary hermeneutics based upon semantic coherence and ethical universals.



Challenges To Abrogation By Ethical And Maqāṣid-Based Approaches

A third body of recent scholarship also challenges abrogation on both textual as well as ethical grounds. (Shāṭibī's 1997) *Al-Muwāfaqāt* puts Islamic law in a teleological tradition whose goals (maqāṣid) are religion, life, intellect, family, and property. The later reformers, drawing on Shāṭibī, hold that doctrine of whatever kind abrogation is no exception ought to work for the advancement of these goals, not their negation. (Saeed 2006) also warns against relying on abrogation too heavily to justify brutal or vindictive judgments are not Qur'anic in its justice and mercy sense. Similarly, (Auda 2008) argues the law is good if it realizes the benefit (maṣlaḥa) and prevents harm (mafsada); a abrogation interpretation which lowers the dignity of human, or rights is the maqāṣid test failure.

These submissions put the debate regarding abrogation into the context of contemporary ethical arguments. They are suggesting that abrogation can never be used as a device for backsliding e.g., by cancelling verses of tolerance, gender equality, or mercy. Instead, morally coherent interpretive hierarchy has to be what governs: verses listing universal moral rules first as interpretive keys, not cancellable units. Modern theologians such as (Hassan 2014) and (An-Naim 2008) sharpen this ethic-legal critique and say that Qur'anic ethical ideals are the functional abrogator of contextspecific legislation of earlier stages of revelation. "Abrogation" is therefore internal moral evolution, and not scriptural repeal. In such a model, abrogation functions more in the mode of moral uplift than abrogation. It reveals a Qur'anic journey of justice, compassion, and wisdom. Maqāṣid-informed critique therefore transforms abrogation into a theory of moral expansion rather than a textual layering tool. It integrates revelation and contemporary language from the human-rights vocabulary without yielding theological inconsistency (Auda 2008; Saeed 2006).

In spite of overall controversy, there are numerous research gaps. To begin with, there is no comprehensive model of a minimalist school of thought that translates the modern scholars' hermeneutic and ethical consideration and makes it practical without sacrificing fidelity to the antique uṣūl. There remains a lot of research in the form of theoretical critique without formulating determinate bases on which to determine that abrogation ought to be employed. Second, comparative study among legal areas e.g., inheritance, war, or dealing with non-Muslims is not available. Second, scientific re-examination of classic examples in minimalist framework can reveal fresh avenues of interpretation. Third, the educational dimension is also overlooked to a great degree: Qur'anic sciences course still imposes inflated abrogation lists without providing contemporary reassessment (Rahman 1982; Auda 2008).

Fourth, institutional application is under-theorized. Modern fatwa councils and legislatures scarcely discuss how reinterpreted abrogation principles may be applied in legislating. The gap between scholarship and applied jurisprudence diminishes the impact of reform. To close it, writers such as (El Fadl 2014) and (Saeed 2018) suggest methodological versatility and peer review when issuing decrees on abrogation, as elsewhere in ethics.

An effective reconstruction of abrogation therefore requires three conditions mutually dependent upon each other: (1) Authenticity of the Text the genuinely clearly authentic and chronologically sequential revelations alone; (2) Irreconcilable Disagreement the disagreement being genuine and not open to specification or context resolution; and (3) Maqāṣid Compatibility the outcome being to preserve justice, mercy, and the general good. Applied to it, most traditional examples of abrogation would be accounted for by contextual development or ethical enhancement, and not cancellation.

For instance, the classical prohibition of alcohol has three phases: an initial identification of its good and evil (2:219), a restriction with allowing prayer (4:43), and a third absolute prohibition (5:90). Classical exegesis employed to interpret the third to abrogate the first two. New minimalist scholarship interprets the process as progressive moral guidance in harmony with social reform rather than abrogation (Rahman 1982; Saeed 2006). Just so, also the evolution from tolerance to armed conflict in passages on war exhibits contextual accommodation to persecution, not withdrawal of peaceful



principles (Auda 2008). These re-readings are perceived in the way minimalist theology preserves Quran's moral integrity and historical incarnation. They are responding to new ethical issues also in the sense of pushing back against absolutism in texts. Pedagogy and law would need to be initiated in this approach by re-reading classical tafsir commentaries and uşul manuals to discern context of interpretation from lasting principle.

Synthesis and Prospects

The sources thus offer four broad phases in the evolution of abrogation: its initial exegetical origin, its scholastic codification, its over-extension, and twentieth-century re-formulation. The first stage implies a sincere effort to balance revelation and social change. The scholastic phase, as seen from al-Amidi and al-Shafi'i, adds methodological sophistication but also reinforces legal positivism. The expansionist period, however, like that of Ibn al-Jawzi and al-Suyuti's writings, is the period of system-building intentionality and polemical hyperbole. Finally, the modern period through Rahman, Abu Zayd, Saeed, Auda, et al. sure centers abrogation on hermeneutics of coherence and ethics.

What ties together the new critics is the assumption that divine revelation contains coherent moral purpose. Abrogation, if it is allowed at all, must confirm such purpose, rather than refute it. Minimalism is therefore not the rejection of abrogation but its cleansing justifying its theoretical necessity without its historic exaggeration. To this path ahead, contemporary scholarship has three options. First, interdisciplinarity with linguistics, semiotics, and ethics can explain textual markers of irreconcilability to a considerable extent. Second, refocusing on case studies i.e., inheritance or gendered choices can probe how maqasid-based minimalism works in practice. Third, institutionalization within religious education and fatwa institutions can facilitate scholar convergence into normative guidance.

The abrogation doctrine is Islam's answer to the problem of change to God's revelation. Traditionalists after al-Shafi'i tried to naturalize it; subsequent scholars accounted for it; and contemporary scholars broke it down and rebuilt it. Through all these stages, there is one thread running through: tension in being loyal to text and being authentic in morals. The modern hermeneutic turn to the side of (Rahman 1982), (Abu Zayd 2006), (Saeed 2006), (Auda 2008), and the reimagines abrogation as a figure for ethical maturation, not an abrogation method. The use of maqasid reasoning makes God's word historically responsive as well as morally continuous.

Lastly, a minimalist theory of abrogation due to authenticity, coherence, and ethical purpose offers a synthesis of tradition and modernity. It rescues abrogation from the extremes of literal abrogation and unqualified rejection by rendering the Quran an organic, purposive book. Placing themselves within its classical roots and infusing it with modern critique, scholars can reconstruct abrogation as a doctrine of progressive revelation attuned to justice and reason actualizing the Quran's eternal moral vision.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

It is qualitative, normative-analytical school best suited to confront the interpretive, and doctrinal character of abrogation (abrogation) in Islamic law. Since abrogation is not so quantifiable fact, but legal argumentative, hermeneutical, and theological in character, empirical or quantitative research would be epistemologically misplaced. Normative-analytic approach enables us to consider how the previous Islamic jurists handled abrogation and hermeneutic thought and make space for reinterpretation of such counsel in language, ethics, and society. It is a combination of orthodox uşul al-fiqh analysis and new interpretation theory trying to meet competing descriptive and evaluative requirements. To (Hallaq 1997) and (Kamali 2003), the Islamic theory of law itself (uşul al-fiqh) itself is itself a combination of text fidelity and rational moral intentionality and thus a normative legal scholarship and hermeneutic critique befitting this intellectual tradition.

The problem is thereby less to be loyal to an abrogation understanding history than to arrange them into the hierarchies of epistemic rank, internal coherence, and relevance to the world as it is now. Paradigm is therefore thus a synthesis of hermeneutic awareness and reconstructionist theory, both



double-speaking true in cases of (Fazlur Rahman 1982) and (Nasr Abu Zayd 2006), both latter being concerned with harmonization between revelation and context in reinterpretation. (Redfern and Hunter 2015) and (Ahmed 2021) among scholars whose juridical internal consistency and doctrinal coherence of law normative theories are the background to the taken analytical stance of the research are also referenced in the research. The research thus has theoretical coherence, interpretive truth, and conceptual soundness in establishing the science of abrogation. Sources of information are three broad categories: (1) canonic foundation works, (2) books of secondary scholarship, and (3) case-based Qur'an and hadith. Canonic works are the initial category of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *tafsīr*, i.e., *Al-Ikem fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām* by al-Amidi, *Al-Risāla* by al-Shafī'i, *Al-Burhān fī 'Ulūm al-Quran* by al-Zarkashī, *Nashik al-Quran* by Ibn al-Jawzī, and *Jami al-Bayān* by al-Tabari. They are taking the place of typological interest, abstract theory, and juristic disagreement at the literary level. They are that potent that medieval intellectual acceptability within Islamic law is derivative (al-Amidi, 1985; al-Shafī'i, 1892/1980). The second category includes later and more recent interpretations of books like (Fazlur Rahman 1982), (Nasr Abu Zayd 2006), (Abdullah Saeed 2006), (Jasser Auda 2008), (Mohammad Hashim Kamali 2003), and (Wael Hallaq 1997), the books of which subject medieval assumptions to modern hermeneutical, linguistic, and ethical analysis. Such books enable rewordings of classical assumptions in the Quranic and towards abrogation making contexts as interactive discourse instead of determinate decree.

Level III includes representative Qur'anic Ayat and authentic hadith reports most frequently quoted in abrogation controversies i.e., prohibition against drugs (2:219, 4:43, 5:90), change of qibla (2:142–150), and law of inheritance (4:11–12, 4:176) and these *Sahih al-Bukhari* and *Sahih Muslim* hadith. There is ample case study material and quote available that provides descriptive detail to theory explanation. Sources are thoroughly studied cover to cover in original Arabic text and, where available, with facing authoritative explanation and translation for cross-checking accuracy. Data triangulation at three levels from classical sources, contemporary scholarship, and case study data ensures richness of analysis, text integrity, and balance of interpretation. Triangulation of qualitative research is therefore rendered credible and reliable by verification of corroboration evidence in a chain or series of corroboration sources for the aforementioned fact, as asserted by (Creswell 2014).

Similarly, process of interpretation is also rendered susceptible to systematic documentation so that researchers in the future can trace the thinking process, a qualitative legal research determinant of reliability (Silverman, 2013). The research moves on five consecutive but related steps: text description, reading cases again, critical hermeneutic reading, framing, and projecting implications. Previous studies as previous movement by text come before targeting in searching and to enlighten novel definitions and abrogation needs of pre-modern jurists, i.e., al-Amidi, al-Shafī'i, al-Ghazali, and al-Jawani.

Terminological coherence between abrogation (abrogation), specification (*takhsīs*), and contextual restriction (*taqyīd*) is assured through reading the sources and limits so defined (Kamali, 2003). The author reveals reference to abrogation lists in *tafsīr* literature of earlier centuries and comparison to later revision thereto, and explains how norms evolved from greater freedom of interpretation of location to greater restricted, rationalized application (al-Zarkashī, 1957; Ibn al-Jawzī, 1998). Second, the hermeneutic school encompasses semantic critique, contextual critique, and *maqāṣid*-based critique in the process of uncovering medieval conclusions' interest in opening them up to question in modern interpretive settings. It requires hermeneutical sensibilities for conformity of the text (*munāsaba*), context of discourse (*siyāq*), and sound reason (*maqāṣid alsharia*) (Auda, 2008; Abu Zayd, 2006).

Back to whether subsequent discovery replaces prior discovery or merely marks out categories for use by such discovering modalities, scholarship is at least more than reading. The poems on wine, for example, are being read as graduated moral pedagogy rather than graduated erasure, in Qur'anic gradation imitation (Rahman, 1982). Third, the exceptional cases like qibla adjustment and law of inheritance are temporarily shelved so that space will be provided for the potentiality of plurality of



juridical and exegetical conclusions in the minimal-abrogation model. The case studies are immanent stories of premodern commentary and hermeneutic reinterpretation in our times in a self-conscious effort at trying to be text-sensitive and jurist-minded.

Fourth, the structure is governed by scientific abrogation process to be employed by experts before the abrogation announcement. The approach utilized is evaluative filtering with assumption of continuity (ijtihad al-hukm), proof against abrogator claimant burden, and maqāṣid test of conformity to higher Qur'anic moral goals (Saeed, 2006; Auda, 2008). Lastly, the implication and recommendation stage maps out the trajectory along which a doctrine so fiercely debated barely voided implications on larger fields of Qur'anic interpretation, fatwah research, Islamic pedagogy of law, and codification of Sharia-based jurisprudence. Mapping trajectories of abrogation, the exercise gives unparalleled value in interpretive duty and agreeability on reformist agendas such as (Hallaq 2009) and (Kamali 2003).

This interpretive-based methodology therefore overrides reason and moral argument and ancient text-based authority in the afterlife. Being qualitative and text-based, the question of how to proceed on addressing the question of reliability, validity, and limitation in such research is to be answered differently from the empirical sciences. Reliability here would mean interpretive consistency of reasons and openness of texts sources accessibility. It has at least two substantive primary sources and a third secondary monograph for every abrogation and re-interpretation case of interpretive validity. Validity is neither qualitative nor quantitative: in explanatory power of outcome model, precedent normality and contemporary hermeneutic plausibility, and argument coherence (Silverman, 2013; Creswell, 2014). Internal congruence of minimalist-abrogation theory is also testing validity whether it accounts for more explanatory power than in catalogues of typical models where abrogation instances had been exaggerated to hundreds of instances. Hermeneutic validity is also ensured by using selfreflexivity: the researcher continuously returns to interpretive assumptions so that they are not exposed to confirmation bias.

Limitations are also open to methodology. There is Islamic intellectual tradition textural incompleteness: variant or new manuscript readings can invalidate prior conclusions. There is context non-transferability: abrogation model elaborate can easily require adaptation in legal cultures or societies Qur'anic explanation resistant to. There is subjectivity of the interpretation model to the extent that hermeneutic encounter is vulnerable to intellectual and moral bias. (Gadamer 1989) and (Abu Zaid 2006) methodology is maintained in that complete hermeneutic neutrality is not presuppositions; the research does as much as it can to restrict personal bias by being as critically reflex an exercise as possible.

Delimitation of scope, finally, is taken into consideration in that abrogation is referred to in the Qur'an only in the one specific case of future juristic abrogation of juridical verdicts. The paradigm and model in this case are themselves more widely transposable to legal practice. This kind of activity normative-analytic argumentation, hermeneutic provocation, and doctrine-formation is typically striving the balance between intellectual innovation and respect for tradition. This is also mirrored in (Fazlur Rahman's 1982) contextual reinterpretation of revelation and (Auda's 2008) systems-thought of Islamic legal theory. By close reading of sources, intertextual triangulation, and discriminatory criticism, the research aims to construct a model of abrogation historically sound, philosophically rigorous, and juridically effective. Before us lies the dilemma of either formative youth or critical reason in our age of globalization, methodology counts in tests and trials in tempering abrogation theory and constructing an intellectually responsible and ethically responsive Islamic hermeneutics.

3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Back To Classical Doctrinal Abrogation Constraints

Classical uṣūl al-fiqh doctrinal abrogation is a finessed hermeneutic technique of patent contradiction avoidance in revelatory texts. It is not an ad hoc evasion tactic of some polemical later-period narratives aimed at fetishizing it, but rather a strict rule imposed on the assumption of textual



purity, incompatibility, and documentable successiveness (al-Amidi, 1985; al-Juwaynī, 1950). They also need strict tests of procedure to eliminate abuse: abrogation was allowed only between two particular Ayat naysay Shahyan and even then, only where efforts through avenues of reconciliation (jam') and specificity (takhsīs) had been vain (Kamali, 2003). Such early premodern efforts at codification such as (al-Suyūṭī 2008) or (Ibn al-Jawzī 1987) are among those which reveal a degree of tension between jurists in trying to cope with the constitutive issue of how precisely one goes about establishing the contradiction.

There is tension during the first stage. Jurists such as al-Shafi'i and al-Amidi stressed restraint, cautioning against such precipitous appeal to abrogation as desecrates divine coherence. Polemicists, on the other hand, utilized abrogation to free liberty from discrediting counter position theological or juridical, and most of all sectarian or apologetic polemics. Inflator use for the purpose of this had the effect that even differences of tone, accent, or context, small as they had been, were utilized as abrogation. Etymology in cognates bayan (clarification), takhsīs (definition), and taqyīd (limitation) removed the limit of the doctrine (Hallaq, 1993).

There had been a dear epistemological cost: where overridden indicated fixity had occurred, override had been applied too carelessly. Soon, more recent uṣūlīs' cautious respect for evidence was theological requirement and hermeneutic necessity. Most well-known aphorism is (al-Amidi 1985) aphorism "reconciliation is better than abrogation" (al-jam' awl min al-abrogation). These are, however, the frailties of classical writers who were generally prompted by surmise to Qur'anic chronology on no empirical foundation. Such unwarranted dependence on surmise in surmised chronology is one of the lows of classical methodology, counted by contemporary scholarship (Hallaq, 1993; Rahman, 1982). Critical re-consideration is thus called for in trying to maintain the methodological rigor of classical school without its extravagance and epistemological permissiveness.

Semantic And Hermeneutic Re-Consideration: Language, Context, And Meaning

Traditional linguistic and discourse-analytic tradition is invoked by modern scholarship to the negligence(s) abrogation, the more so the so-called contradiction one that is a result of unjustified interpretive colonization of Qur'anic polyvalence. Arabic root nskh signifies as broad and as universal meanings as "to copy," "to transfer," "to substitute," and "to efface" (Rahman, 1982). Problem of contextual is one of relevant meaning. Therefore, then, in that where the Qur'an says, "We do not abrogate (nansakh) a verse or cause it to be forgotten except that We bring forth one better than it or like it" (Q 2:106), the term can be used to describe re-inscription divine or functional replacement and not juridical abrogation (Saeed, 2006). As with the same premises, the following verse, "When We substitute one revelation for another..." (Q 16:101), must be read as referring to the process of revelation as chronological divine pedagogic progression not juridical abrogation (Abu Zayd, 2006). Philological and hermeneutic re-readings thus re-map conception's space. (Fazlur Rahman 1982) viewed abrogation as an ethical and social process of development: the revelation spoke to a living generation whose tradition developed step by step, piece by piece. Structural (nazm) consistency of argument explains a good deal of reported contradiction if each surah is seen in its rhetoric and functional setting, as one can discover in (Farid Esack 1997) and (Abdullah Saeed 2006). For example, injunction and abstention are speech act isomorphic with promise or story (Abu Zayd, 2006). A resistant reading that resists identifying analogy between different instances of textual genre. Secondly, discourse coherence theory accounts for how verses sometimes supplement each other in thematically coherent passages. That such a calling verse of progressive reform to be followed by another predictive fulfillment of the same reform but without abrogation.

Therefore, rather than speculating abrogation as erasure or cancellation, the new semantic school is speculating abrogation as hierarchical explanation or pedagogical ordering. This hermeneutic charity relocates divine discourse from mechanism to intentionality and dialogue. Qur'anic selfreferential indeterminacy then requires a model of abrogation were contextual sense trumps formal contradiction. This linguistic creativity also enables interfaith hermeneutics. Both Jewish and Christian theologians have struggled with the supersessions beliefs new covenants replacing previous



laws but contemporary theology would prefer them to be an evolutionary paradigm change and not an abrogation of God's will. It is likely feasible for Islamic hermeneutics to be read so as to allow room for continuity of development without precluding text sacredness (Rahman, 1982). The result is a lexically richer and a morally richer theory of abrogation because the lexical richness of the Arabic Qur'an has the moral telos of revelation.

Chronology And Reconstruction Of Authority

Revelation and Report The traditional theory of abrogation consists in the tacit assumption that one can place revelation in a chronology where it is possible to abrogate the other. But pre-revelation order prehistory is controversial and incomplete. Evidence in some degree a verse was subsequently uncovered depends upon inadmissible reports or speculative exegesis (Hallaq, 1993). Modern historians of Qur'anic codification warn against post-revelation chronology as deduction from theme and mnemonic structure and not fact (Saeed, 2006). The majority of the traditional conclusions of abrogation are therefore based on weak foundations. No less dubious is hadith exegesis to abrogation of Qur'anic law. Epistemological preference for mass-transmitted (mutawatir) reports over singleton reports (āḥād) revelation is fallacy of reason for the latter to take the place of the former (al-Amidi, 1985; Kamali, 2003).

The Qur'ān in this regard is categorical knowledge (qaṭ'ī al-thubūt), whereas singleton hadith is plausible knowledge (ẓannī al-thubūt). Epistemological topsy-turvy thus to allow a report of probability to override a certain text. It is on such an assumption that the majority of classical jurists thought abrogation not to be a principle. Abrogation in a hadith has minimal more in a worse position. This surplus of transmission and suspicion of chronology render knowing precedence of a hadith over the other in time sure. Reformist modernists therefore employ minimalist orthodoxy: abrogation is only allowed where (1) all verses possess equal authority, (2) all share equal or more or less equal epistemic status, (3) semantic incompatibility between them is pervasive, and (4) chronological priority can be established (Kamali, 2003; Hallaq, 1993).

Free of all that, reconciliatory interpretation must prevail. But there is a reverse side to this coin, sociology of power. Abrogation during the Middle Ages was institutional and exegetical: usurpation of scriptural meaning by the jurists. The scholars withheld from certain verses their "operation" and so evaded the edge of legal normativity.

Modern criticism provides an establishment that such an act was closure and end of interpretive difference. This is expressed by (Rahman 1982) and (Abu Zayd 2006) in wholesale epistemic closure that had shut up living revelation into dead law. Opening up chronological and epistemic presuppositions, therefore, is equally a call for reopening interpretive life anew in the ethics of the Qur'an.

Maqāṣid, Ethical Continuity, And Reconstruction

Today The maqāṣid al-sharia theory is fertile ground on which abrogation can be reconstructed as ethical continuity rather than replacement of the text. Earlier innovators such as (al-Shāṭibī 1997) demonstrated that God's law was teleologically meaningful to safeguard fundamental human interests' religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. Subsequent writers like (Auda 2008) formalized the teleological theory still further into an even more formalized dynamic systems model with judicial rulings as adaptive solutions in cases to higher-order objectives.

Abrogation on such a theory is hermeneutic adaptation, not abrogation. Abrogation on such grounds is only where a later decision is an expression of an overruling interest of the higher interests of welfare and justice (maṣlaḥa) in changed circumstances. It is no indication of God's arbitrariness but a demonstration of God's responsiveness. The Qur'anic prohibition against intoxicants would be an example. The evolution during change from disapproving restraint (Q 2:219) to qualified prohibition (Q 4:43) to absolute prohibition (Q 5:90) is pedagogic enrichment and not contradiction (Ibn al-Jawzī, 1987; Rahman, 1982). E.g., above verses are normatively pedagogical and situated in context both to social context and to the policy of gradualism (tadarruj). Legislative follow-up in successive legislation is echoing but not annulling previous wisdom (Kamali, 2003). The qibla change



(Q 2:142–150) is therefore. Classical exegesis correctly names it an early instance of ritual abrogation: Jerusalem-direction is initially supplanted by Mecca with richly elaborate rites (al-Ṭabarī, 2000). This very substitution, in *maqāṣid* terminology coined, is attempted by disjunction yet symbolic cohesion of Muslim identity. It is proof of continuity of cult and providence of God and not of theological disjunction. Even abrogation assumed, therefore, seems to show consistency on the higher level of morals.

Succession and legacy again threaten assumption of specification for abrogation. Medieval thinkers had assumed that law of succession (Q 2:180) had been abrogated by later distribution of portions in legacy (Q 4:11–12) commanded (al-Suyūṭī, 2008). It came to be understood by those scholars as *takhsīs*: exception of application of the previous one instead of abrogation. Lexical and contextual indicators confirmed this differentiation, again upholding the word of God to be in effect with multi-level specificity instead of contradiction. The above examples, substantiated doctrine can be formalized in a seven-step process: Source primacy filter Restrict abrogation to Qur'anvs-Qur'an or authoritative compilations of hadith. Semantic integrity test Real contradiction test at syntactic and pragmatic levels. Contextual differentiation Advocate non-conflict at expense of contextual or audience adaptation.

This ladder of approaches is a tour de force of classical restraint and hermeneutic reserve. It equips jurists with bucklers of warrant from God and is answerable in interpretation. It brings together linguistic, moral, and epistemic constraint into a single paradigm of scriptural reasoning for the first time. Their other implications transcend jurisprudence. Pedagogy of exegesis substitution of parrot imitation of "abrogated" verses by ordered competency entails critical thinking and ethical reasoning. Courts would be forced to apply contextual reasoning in decisions, extrapolating abrogation judgments onto *maqāṣid* consideration in plain language terms. That held them to responsibility and precluded parroted appeal to abrogation on political or ideological arguments.

They are forced to push back the change because they struggle with intransigent interests and immobilizing methodology. Orthodox scholars view semantic and teleological reinterpretations as sheer surrender to modern rationalism. The call for the change, however, springs from noble tradition. Al-Shafī'i's asceticism of genuine transmission, al-Amidi's fear of dissensus, and al-Shāṭibī's telos of ethics are all expressions of an unhistoric thrust towards coherence and moderation. Contemporary hermeneutics has nothing to offer except linguistics, ethics, and critical history. Clarity of rule can remove some piquancy of opposition. Abrogation as ethical exposition and not textual abrogation makes Islamic theology responsible to revelation and responsive to the challenge of modern ethics. The word of God is ever determinate but experimentally open to enact.

This openness is nothing but the Qur'anic self-characterization as "guidance and mercy" (Q 10:57). Paradigm shift is based on that moral authority where revelation recapitulates itself in the right way so that it can evolve itself to new conditions of man without transcendence being violated. This is how abrogation should be understood as a hermeneutic between graduated parameters, and not as a mechanical abstractor system. Early custom tried to limit it; later orthodoxy overstated it; modern scholarship with philological and moral tools can bring it back to the middle path. This minimalist, *maqāṣid*-based method of semantic continuity, contextual congruence, and ethical continuity reopens Qur'anic interpretation without theologically compromising. It is here, then, that learning becomes a growth from a codification of don'ts to the way of love a growth which is fair to both the high tradition of Islamic law and to the living universalism of God's guidance.

4. CONCLUSION

The examination of the doctrine of abrogation (abrogation) in Islamic jurisprudence shows intellectual richness and methodological vulnerability of this very old idea. Throughout history, abrogation appeared to govern scriptural multiplicity, balancing perceived contradictions among sequential revelations (al-Amidi, 1985; al-Juwaynī, 1950). Early jurists handled it as a rational hermeneutic tool guaranteeing juridic consistency and versatility in changing socio-historical



environments. But in centuries of untrammelled expansion, its thoughtless extension broke what otherwise had been a narrow mechanism of interpretation into a wide instrument of erasure thus attenuating both the moral and linguistic integrity of the Qur'an (Kamali, 2003; Hallaq, 1993).

Orthodox commentators like (al-Shafi'i 1892/1980) maintained abrogation only where reconciliation was impossible, but later commentators enumerated dozens of instances, frequently confusing abrogation with specification (*takhṣīs*), contextual restriction (*taqyīd*), or progression in ethical teaching (*tadarruj*). The multiplicity, as a technique for attaining resolution out of exegetical tension, eventually undermined faith in objective interpretation. (Ibn al-Jawzī 1987) infamously enumerated more than 200 verses abrogated most now accepted by contemporary scholars to have been misjudged. Such inflation was more the result of medieval jurisprudence's polemical and sectarian trend rather than a purely textual necessity (Rahman, 1982).

Abrogation is nowadays explained by today's critical understanding of abrogation by reformist scholars such as Fazlur Rahman, Nasr Abu Zayd, and Jasser Auda as contextual development of divine speech but not as divinely revoked. (Rahman 1982) suggests that revelation was suited to concrete historical situations but encoded timeless moral mandates. Abrogation thus constituted ethical development, not cancellation. (Abu Zayd 2006) took this hermeneutic realignment one step further in claiming that early exegesis petrified meaning through juridical stratification to the detriment of discursive coherence. To this vision, abrogation ought not suppress verses but re-place them within a living moral dialogue.

Apart from this, modern interpreters use linguistic and coherence-based exegesis (*naẓm al-Qur'ān*) to show that the verses previously considered contradictory are well capable of conveying complementary ethical meanings. For instance, the so-called "sword verse" (Q 9:5) traditionally charged with repealing peaceful commandments (Q 2:190; Q 60:8) is re-interpreted on the basis of contextual sequencing as referring to treaty breaches, not cosmic enmity (Saeed, 2006). Such reinterpretation re-establishes the Qur'an's moral and rhetorical coherence. The larger lesson is epistemological: abrogation reveals the boundaries of literalism and pitfalls of textual absolutism. By invoking abrogation too readily, classical interpreters occasionally sidestepped the task of interpretive harmonization and ethical argumentation. This touches on what (Hallaq 1993) describes as the "juristic anxiety of contradiction" a proclivity toward stabilizing divine speech with technical categorization, not hermeneutic patience. Yet this same anxiety, unchecked, eroded interpretive suppleness and moral nuance.

The research therefore concludes that contemporary redefinition of abrogation has to include discipline, minimalism, and ethical consistency. Minimalist pedagogy is cautious in its abrogation approach as a measure of last resort, to be utilized only after attempting all avenues of reconciliation open to it semantic, chronological, contextual, and teleological. It opts for interpretive restraint and accepts the layering of revelation. This is consistent with the *maqāṣid al-sharia* (purpose of law) approach, in which abrogation is utilized for higher ethical ends such as justice, mercy, and public good (Auda, 2008).

At the same time, current research acknowledges that the complete elimination of abrogation is pragmatically impossible and also unhistorical. Some legislative changes such as the gradual banning of alcoholic drinks or reform of the laws of inheritance have real temporal ordering (al-Amidi, 1985). Far from considering them divine contradictions, however, they must be identified as sequenced moral pedagogy "progressive revelation" intended to enable ethical internalization (Rahman, 1982). And thus, abrogation continues not as a technique of erasure, but as testimony to divine instruction and humanly differing receptivity.

Theologically, re-conceptualizing abrogation reaffirms the moral integrity of revelation. The Qur'an, as read in terms of thematic coherence and intertextual arguments, is an autarchic discourse whose constituent elements shed light upon one another (al-Farahi, 2008). Abrogation is therefore a model of interpretation rather than a mechanical operation. This hermeneutical reworking maintains



textual veneration as well as intellectual sincerity in matters of belief in God's wisdom while enabling moral reason.

Finally, the conclusion of this research is not the elimination of abrogation but the rehabilitation of abrogation under fresh epistemic discipline. By combining classical rigor and contemporary linguistic and moral analysis, scholars can restore its initial purpose: ensuring coherence, not imposing suppression. This kind of doctrine harmonizes the Qur'an's ahistorical moral authority with contextualization within history, making it relevant to contemporary Muslim societies. As (Kamali 2003) summarizes, the future of Islamic jurisprudence depends not on expanding abrogation lists but on deepening interpretive consciousness.

5. REFERENCES

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